In the past, the security notions of cryptography were modeled under the assumption that private (or secret) keys are completely hidden to adversaries. Nowadays, these security notions could be insufficient due to a new kind of threat, called "side-channel attacks", by which an adversary obtains partial information of private (or secret) keys via employing specific properties resulting from physical implementations of cryptographic schemes. In order to resist such side-channel attacks, numerous leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes have been proposed. However, there is little work on studying leakage-resilient certificateless cryptographic schemes. In this article, we propose the first leakage-resilient certificateless signature (LR-CLS) scheme under the continual leakage model. In the generic bilinear group model, we demonstrate that our scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries. Finally, performance analysis is made to demonstrate that the proposed LR-CLS scheme is suitable for resource-constrained devices.
Introduction
In the conventional public key settings [14, 33] , a certificate is employed to validate the mapping between a user's identity and her/his associated public key. In order to remove the certificate usage, Shamir [36] introduced the concept of identity (ID)-based public key setting. Based on Shamir's concept, Boneh and Franklin [7] proposed the first practical construction of IDbased encryption (IBE) from bilinear pairings. In an ID-based public key setting, identity information of a user is viewed as the user's public key, by which a trusted private key generator (PKG) can produce and send the corresponding private key to the user. Under this circumstance, the PKG knows private keys of all the users. In other words, all the ID-based public key settings suffer from the key escrow problem in the sense that the PKG may decrypt all the ciphertexts or sign the messages on behalf of all users.
In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] proposed a new public key paradigm, termed certificateless public key setting (CL-PKS), to resolve the key escrow problem mentioned above. In CL-PKS, a user's private key consists of two components, namely, an initial key and a secret key. In addition, there exists a semi-trusted third party, called the key generation center (KGC), who is responsible to produce the user's initial key by its system secret key and the user's identity information. Meanwhile, the user randomly chooses a secret key and computes the corresponding public key without requiring any certificate. Hence, the KGC cannot access the user's private key due to the lack of the secret key generated by the user. Therefore, the CL-PKS not only resolves the key escrow problem in ID-based public key settings but also removes the certificate management in conventional public key public key settings. In the past decade, the research on CL-PKS has great progress and numerous cryptographic schemes have been proposed [19-24, 29, 30, 39, 40, 44, 46] .
The security notions for these public key settings mentioned above (including conventional, ID-based and certificateless) were modeled under the assumption that both the system's and users' private (or secret) keys are completely hidden to an adversary. Nowadays, these security notions could be insufficient due to a new kind of threat, called "side-channel attacks", such as fault attack [4, 6] , power analysis [27] , timing attack [10, 28] , etc. For side-channel attacks, an adversary may obtain partial information of private (or secret) keys by employing specific properties resulting from physical implementations of cryptographic schemes. Thus, even if a cryptographic scheme was proven secure in an adversary model without addressing side-channel attacks, the cryptographic scheme could be broken in an environment where an adversary may obtain the partial information of private (or secret) keys. Leakage-resilient cryptography provides a solution to counteract side-channel attacks. Very recently, the study of leakage-resilient cryptography has received significant attention. Based on conventional public key settings, numerous leakage-resilient public key encryption schemes [2, 11, 26, 32] and leakage-resilient signature schemes [3, 15, 16, 18, 25, 38] have been proposed.
Related Work
The security notion of leakage-resilient cryptography is that a cryptographic scheme is still secure even if the partial leakage information of the private (or secret) keys involved in the scheme is visible to the adversary. In order to represent the leakage resilience of cryptographic schemes, adversary models must define the capabilities of an adversary leaking the partial information of the private (or secret) keys. For representing the leakage ability of an adversary, there are two kinds of leakage models, namely, bounded leakage model and continual leakage model, which are described as follows. Typically, a cryptographic scheme consists of several computation rounds. In leakage-resilient cryptography, a leakage function f is given and f (τ) is viewed as the leakage information, where τ indicates the data (including permanent and temporary secret values) accessed during the current computation round. The output length of f is restricted to λ bits, that is, the leakage information of each computation round is bounded. On the other hand, if the total leakage information of a cryptographic scheme is unbounded, the whole private key would completely be revealed to the adversary so that it will injure the security of the cryptographic scheme. Hence, several leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes [3, 25] make a restriction on the overall leakage information to be bounded. This is called the bounded leakage model. However, this restriction is not practical. In recently proposed leakage-resilient cryptographic schemes, the continual leakage model is the most accredited model for leakage ability of an adversary, which provides the overall unbounded leakage property than the bounded leakage model. The continual leakage model possesses the following properties [9, 12, 18] : _ Only computation leakage: Only temporary and permanent secret values currently accessed in a computation round could be leaked to a side-channel adversary. _ Overall unbounded leakage: The overall amount of leakage information is assumed to be unbounded. Hence, after (or before) each computation round, the secret value must be refreshed (updated). It is obvious that the leakage bound can be restricted between any two successive secret value refreshes.
Based on conventional public key settings, several leakage-resilient public key encryption and signature schemes were proposed under the continual leakage model, which are surveyed as follows. In 2010, Kiltz and Pietrzak [26] proposed a leakage-resilient public key encryption in the generic bilinear group (GBG) model [5] . The GBG model is viewed as a kind of security proving technique, which will be defined in Section 2. It is worth mentioning, that the GBG model may be employed in the security proofs of cryptographic schemes under non-leakage model, bounded leakage model and continual leakage model. Following Kiltz and Pietrzak's technique in the GBG model, Galindo and Vivek [18] proposed a secure leakage-resilient signature scheme. Afterwards, based on Boneh et al.'s short signature [8] and GBG model, Tang et al. [38] presented an improved leakage-resilient signature scheme which reduces one exponential computation compared with Galindo and Vivek's scheme [18] . The security of Tang et al.'s scheme is based on both the GBG model and the random oracle model. In 2016, based on the generic bilinear group, Galindo et al. [17] also presented and implemented a new leakage-resilient ElGamal public key encryption scheme, which is the newest implementation for leakage-resilient protocols in the GBG model.
In ID-based public key settings, Brakerski et al. [9] proposed the first leakage-resilient ID-based encryption (LR-IBE) scheme under the continual leakage model. Afterwards, Yuen et al. [45] proposed an improved LR-IBE scheme to improve performance. In 2016, the first leakage-resilient ID-based signature (LR-IBS) was proposed by Wu et al. [42] . Under the continual leakage model, their LR-IBS scheme allows an adversary to learn partial information of both the system secret key in the key extract phase and the user's private key in the signing phase during the entire lifetime of the system. Also, their LR-IBS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against ID and adaptive chosen message (EUF-CMA) attacks. Nevertheless, Wu et al.'s LR-IBS scheme is constructed under the ID-based public key settings, so it suffers from the key escrow problem mentioned earlier.
Contribution and Organization
In the past, there is little work on studying the design of leakage-resilient certificateless cryptographic schemes. In 2013, Xiong et al. [43] proposed the first leakage-resilient certificateless public key encryption scheme (with various leakage conditions) for Type I adversary (outsider) and Type II adversary (honest-but-curious KGC), following the classification in traditional certificateless public key encryption [24] . Up to now, no work has been done on the design of leakage-resilient certificateless signature (LR-CLS).
In this article, we will propose the first leakage-resilient certificateless signature scheme under the continual leakage model. We first define the security notions for LR-CLS schemes under the continual leakage model. The security notions include two kinds of attackers, namely, Type I adversary (outsider) and Type II adversary (honest-but-curious KGC). Both kinds of adversaries are extended from the security notions of traditional certificateless signature (CLS) schemes by adding the key leakage queries. Under the continual leakage model, the proposed LR-CLS scheme is allowed to leak partial information of the system secret key in the initial key extract phase and the user's private key in the signing phase. In the generic bilinear group model, we demonstrate that our scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries. Finally, performance analysis is made to demonstrate that the proposed LR-CLS scheme is suitable for resource-constrained devices.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present preliminaries. The framework and security notions of LR-CLS schemes are defined in Section 3, while a concrete LR-CLS scheme is proposed in Section 4. The security of the proposed LR-CLS scheme is formally proved in Section 5. In
Section 6, we demonstrate the performance analysis of the proposed LR-CLS scheme. Conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the concepts of bilinear groups [7, 35, 41] , the notions of the generic bilinear group model [5, 18, 42] and the entropy.
Bilinear Groups
Let G denote a multiplicative group of large prime order p while G T is also a multiplicative cyclic group with the same order. Assume that g is an arbitrary generator of G. An admissible bilinear pairing is a map e: G×G→G T which satisfies the following three properties: Meanwhile, G is called a bilinear group and G T is the target group of the admissible bilinear map e. A reader can refer to previous literatures such as [7, 35, 41] for a more comprehensive description of groups, maps and other parameters.
Generic Bilinear Groups Model
In 1997, Shoup [37] introduced the notions of the generic group model which is viewed as a kind of security proving technique for cryptographic schemes. In this model, the adversary is only given access to a randomly chosen encoding of a group controlled by a challenger. Basically, the model includes an oracle that executes the group operation [31] 
Note that if g is a generator of the group G, we have g = ε(1) and g T =e(g, g) = ε T (1).
Entropy
Entropy is a measure of the number of possible microscopic states (or microstates) of a system in thermodynamic equilibrium. The interpretation of entropy in statistical mechanics is the measure of uncertainty. Let X be a finite random variable and Pr be the associated probability distribution. Min-entropy is a way of measuring the worst-case predictability of a random variable. We define two kinds of min-entropies as follows:
1 The min-entropy of a finite random variable X is defined as . 2 The average conditional min-entropy of X under a given correlated random variable Z is defined as
Dodis et al. [13] provided the following result on the entropy.
Lemma 1. Let f: X→{0,1}
λ′ be a leakage function on a given random variable X, where λ′ is a fixed length. We have 
Framework and Security Notions
In this section, we define the framework and security notions of leakage-resilient certificateless signature (LR-CLS) schemes under the continual leakage model.
Al-Riyami and Paterson [1] presented the concept of the certificateless public key setting (CL-PKS) and proposed a concrete certificateless signature (CLS) scheme. In CL-PKS, the key generation center (KGC) with a system secret key is responsible to produce the user's initial key, while the user randomly chooses a secret key and computes the corresponding public key. However, formal security notions of CLS schemes were not given until the work of Yum and Lee [46] and Huang et al. [22] . Later, Hu et al. [19] enhanced the definitions in [22, 46] to permit stronger queries for adversaries. Since then, Hu et al.'s security model formalizes the security notions of CLS schemes. In this model, there are two kinds of adversaries, namely, Type I (outsider), Type II (honest-but-curious KGC). A Type I adversary A I acts as an outsider, without the system secret key, who can replace the public key of any entity with another of her/his own choice. In other words, the outsider may obtain the secret key of any entity. A Type II adversary A II models an honest-but-curious KGC that owns the system secret key, but cannot perform any public key replacement. That is, the honest-but-curious KGC knows the initial key of any entity.
Next, we introduce the so-called stateful from the continual leakage model in [26] . A cryptographic scheme under the continual leakage model is called stateful if the private/secret key must be updated before (or after) executing the cryptographic algorithm while the associated public key remains fixed. To be stateful, each private/secret key must be divided into two parts and stored in different parts of the memory. Hence, for a CLS scheme, we separate the initial key extract algorithm, as well as the signing algorithm, into two steps. In addition, the system secret key and user's private key are separated into two parts, respectively. That is, the two steps of the signing algorithm are carried out by the two parts of the private key, respectively, while the two steps of the initial key extract algorithm are carried out by the two parts of the system secret key. 
Framework of LR-CLS

Security Notions of LR-CLS
where |func| denotes the output length of the function func. The outputs of four leakage functions are defined as follows.
Here, parameters are the random values involved in the computation of each Extract and Sign round. Note that TI IE and TI S are the outputs of Extract-1 and Sign-1, respectively.
In the LR-CLS scheme under the continual leakage model, the security notions include two kinds of attackers, namely, Type I attacker (outsider) and Type II attacker (honest-but-curious KGC). Both kinds of attackers are extended from the security notions of traditional certificateless signature (CLS) schemes [19, 22, 46] by adding the key leakage queries. In such a scheme, the system secret key is used to generate the user's initial key by the KGC and the user's private key is used to generate the signature by the signer. Hence, under the continual leakage model, LR-CLS schemes are allowed to leak partial information of the system secret key in the Initial key extract phase and the user's private key in the Sign phase.
The adversary model of LR-CLS schemes under the continual leakage model consists of two kinds of adversaries, namely, Type I (outsider), Type II (honest-but-curious KGC). _ Type I adversary (outsider): An adversary of this type cannot access the system secret key, but she/ he can replace the public key of any entity with another of her/his own choice. In other words, the adversary may obtain the secret key of any entity. Meanwhile, the adversary may obtain not only the leakage information of a user's initial key of the private key in the Sign phase, but also the leakage information of the KGC's system secret key in the Initial key extract phase.
_ Type II adversary (honest-but-curious KGC): An adversary of this type is an honest-but-curious KGC who has access to the system secret key, but cannot perform any public key replacement. That is, the honest-but-curious KGC knows the initial key of any entity while obtaining the leakage information of a user's secret key of the private key in the Sign phase.
In the following, we employ a security game to model security notions of LR-CLS schemes under the continual leakage model. The security game describes the interactions between a challenger and an adversary. sary A (including Types I and II adversaries) has a non-negligible advantage in the following UF-LR-CLS-ACMA game played with a challenger C. The advantage of the adversary A is defined as the probability that A wins the games. Such an adversary A is referred as an UF-LR-CLS-ACMA adversary.
_ Setup. The challenger C takes as input a security parameter and runs the Setup algorithm to produce the first system secret key (S 0,1 , S 0,2 ) and a list of public parameters PP. PP is given to the adversary A. Meanwhile, if A is of Type II adversary, C gives the system secret key (S 0,1 , S 0,2 ) to the adversary A.
If A is of Type I adversary, the system secret key (S 0,1 , S 0,2 ) is kept secret by the challenger C.
_ Queries. The adversary A can adaptively make numerous queries to the challenger C as follows.
_ Initial key extract query(ID). For the i-th Extract
round, upon receiving this query along with a user's identity ID, the challenger C uses the current system secret key ( _ Public key retrieve query (ID). When A issues this query along with an identity ID, the challenger C returns the corresponding public key PID=(QID, RID) to A.
_ Public key replace query (ID, PID´=(QID´, RID´)).
Upon receiving this query, the user's original public key is replaced with PID´=(QID´, RID´) and the challenger C records the replacement.
_ Secret key extract query (ID). When A issues this query along with an identity ID, the challenger C returns the secret key SID 0 . Here, the query is forbidden if the identity ID has already appeared in the public key replace query.
_ Sign query (ID, m).
For the j-th Sign round, upon receiving this query along with a user's identity ID and a message m, the challenger C uses the user's current private key ( 
The Proposed LR-CLS Scheme
Based on the leakage-resilient signature scheme in [18] and the leakage-resilient ID-based signature scheme in [42] , we present the first LR-CLS scheme, as defined in Section 3.1, which consists of seven algorithms. Fig. 1 
; or rejects it otherwise. In the following, we show the correctness of the verifying equality as follows. 
Figure 1
The key generation processes of the KGC and users
Figure 2
The Sign and Verify algorithms of the proposed scheme
The i-th round • Current system secret key The j-th round of ID • Current private key 
Security Analysis
In the proposed LR-CLS scheme, a user's private key consists of two components, namely, an initial key and a secret key. As the aforementioned UF-LR-CLS-ACMA game in Definition 1, there are two kinds of adversaries, which include Type I (outsider) and Type II (honest-but-curious KGC). In the generic bilinear group model, we demonstrate that our LR-CLS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries 
In the proposed LR-CLS scheme, a user's private key consists of two components, namely, an initial key and a secret key. As the aforementioned UF-LR-CLS-ACMA game in Definition 1, there are
In the proposed LR-CLS scheme, a user's private key consists of two components, namely, an initial key and a secret key. As the aforementioned UF-LR-CLS-ACMA game in Definition 1, there are two kinds of adversaries, which include Type I (outsider) and Type II (honest-but-curious KGC). In the generic bilinear group model, we demonstrate that our LR-CLS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries under the continual leakage model. We first prove that the non-leakage version of our LR-CLS scheme without leakage queries, denoted by Π NL , is UF-CLS-ACMA secure in the generic bilinear group model. Then, based on the security of the non-leakage version, we demonstrate that our proposed LR-CLS scheme under the continual leakage model is UF-LR-CLS-ACMA secure in the generic bilinear group model. In the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we first prove that our non-leakage version Π NL is UF-CLS-ACMA secure against Type I and Type II adversaries in Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. Based on the security of the non-leakage version, by adding extra leak queries, we then prove that our LR-CLS scheme under the continual leakage model is UF-LR-CLS-ACMA secure against Type I and Type II adversaries in Theorems 3 and 4, respectively. Figure. 3 demonstrates the relationships of the associated four security theorems. In addition, Figure 4 depicts the conceptual principle of the security games g NL-I and g NL-II employed in Theorems 1 and 2. Theorem 1. In the generic bilinear group model, the non-leakage version Π NL of the proposed LR-CLS scheme is provably secure against the Type I adversary (outsider). Proof: Let A NL-I be a Type I adversary who can break the non-leakage CLS scheme Π NL while A NL-I is allowed to issue all the queries at most q times. The advantage of A NL-I is defined as the probability that A NL-I wins the following game g NL-I played with a challenger C. Game g NL-I : In the game g NL-I , there are three phases, Setup, Queries and Forgery phases. At the end of this game, A NL-I outputs a forgery signature. In Queries phase, A NL-I may issue eight kinds of queries in any order at most q times. Three phases are described as below: _ Setup phase: The challenger C builds and maintains two lists L G and L T which are used to record group elements in G and G T , respectively, described below. 
Figure 3
The relationships of four security theorems
Figure 4
The conceptual principle of the security games g NL-I and g NL-II in Theorems 1 and 2
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− VerifyNL: Upon receiving the signature (σ1, σ2), a verifier accepts the signature if e(g,
, where QID and RID are the public keys of the user with identity ID; or rejects it otherwise. In the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we first prove that our non-leakage version ΠNL is UF-CLS-ACMA secure against Type I and Type II adversaries in Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. Based on the security of the non-leakage version, by adding extra leak queries, we then prove that our LR-CLS scheme under the continual leakage model is UF-LR-CLS-ACMA secure against Type I and Type II adversaries in Theorems 3 and 4, respectively. Figure. 3 demonstrates the relationships of the associated four security theorems. In addition, Figure 4 depicts the conceptual principle of the security games gNL-I and gNL-II employed in Theorems 1 and 2. Moreover, C selects a random bit string
_ Finally, C tries to find a pair ( 
3 The degrees of all multivariate polynomials in the set {F G } are at most 2 by the following reasons: _ All the elements in {S} and {T} are polynomials with only one term, hence all the polynomials in {S} and {T} are of degree 1. F G,f,1,3  and F G,f,1,4 be the polynomials corresponding to QID ID* and RID ID* , respectively. Also, let F G,f,1,1 and F G,f,1,2 be  the polynomials corresponding to ξ G,f,1,1 * and ξ G,f,1,2 *, respectively. Then C computes the polynomial F G,f,1 Here, let us discuss the situations that A NL-I wins the game g NL-I . We say that A NL-I wins the game g NL-I if one of the following two cases occurs: _ Case 1. There exists a collision in group G or G T . We describe them as below: In the real UF-CLS-ACMA game defined in Definition 1, the success probability in the game g NL-I is an upper bound of the advantage of A NL-I . In the following, we discuss the probabilities of two cases in the game g NL-I . The probabilities of two cases are computed as below: _ Case 1. If there exists a collision in group G or G T , then one may solve the discrete logarithm problem in G or G T [26] . Assume that F G,i and
In such a case, the polynomial F G,C =F G,i -F G,j is a non-zero polynomial, whose degree is at most 2. By Lemma 2 in Section 2, the probability of
. Similarly, since the maximal degree of polynomials in L T is at most 4, the collision probability in L T is at most (4/p) ( )
_ Case 2. In this case, the success probability of A NL-I is the probability that A NL-I can forge a valid signature (m*, ID*, σ f,i,1 *, ξ G,f,i,2 *) ) which satisfies the equality F G,f,1,5 (x, m 0 , m 1 , u 0 , u 1 , {s}, {t})=  0, where F G,f,1,5 =X+F G,f,1,4 ,1,2 -F G,f,1,1 . Here, the polynomial F G,f,1,5 has degree at most 3. In the meantime, F G,f,1,5 is a nonzero polynomial that will be proved in Lemma 3 later. In such a case, by Lemma 2 in Section 2, the probability of Case 2 is at most 3/p.
Since |L G |+|L T |≦6q as mentioned earlier, the advantage that A NL-I wins the game g NL-I in Case 1 or 2 is at most 
is non-zero since ( G,f,i,1 *, ξ G,f,i,2 *) ). It is worth mentioning, where there are two restrictions: (1) ID* has never been issued during the Secret key extract query Q SE ; (2) (m*, ID*) has never been issued during the Sign query Qs.
In the real UF-CLS-ACMA game defined in Definition 1, the success probability in the game g NL All queries in Fig. 4 Initial key extract leak query 
The probabilities of two cases: All queries in Fig. 4 Initial key extract leak query 
The probabilities of two cases: In Theorems 1 and 2, we have proved the security of the non-leakage version of the proposed LR-CLS scheme. In the following, based on the security of the non-leakage version, we prove that the proposed LR-CLS scheme under the continual leakage model is UF-LR-CLS-ACMA secure against Type I and Type II adversaries in Theorems 3 and 4, respectively. Figure 5 demonstrates the conceptual principle of the security games g LR-I and g LR-II employed in Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 3. In the generic bilinear group model, the proposed LR-CLS scheme is provably secure against the Type I adversary (outsider) under the continual leakage model.
Proof:
We have proven that the non-leakage version of our proposed scheme is secure against the Type I adversary in Theorem 1. Here, the adversary is allowed to issue two extra queries, namely, Initial key extract leak query and Sign leak query. Hence we modify the game described in Theorem 1. Let A LR-I be a Type I adversary who can break our LR-CLS scheme Π LR while A LR-I is allowed to issue all the queries at most q times. The advantage of A LR-I is defined as the probability Figure 5 The conceptual principle of the security games g LR-I and g LR-II in Theorems 3 and 4 All oracles in Fig. 4 All queries in Fig. 4 Initial key extract leak query cost of the proposed LR-CLS scheme. Their implementation environment is presented as follows. The processor is an ARM Cortex-M3 CPU. The group G is an elliptic curve group over F p with a bit-length of 254 bits while G T is a subgroup of the multiplicative group of the extension field F p12 . The required computational costs (in 106 clock cycles) of T e and T p are 4.5 and 65, respectively. Here, the multiplication operation is ignored as compared with T e and T p . Table 1 lists the required computational costs (in 106 clock cycles) of the Initial key extract, Sign and Verify phases in the proposed LR-CLS scheme. It is obvious that the proposed LR-CLS scheme is well suitable for mobile devices. 
Conclusions
In this article, we proposed the first LR-CLS scheme under the continual leakage model. We defined the new security notions for LR-CLS schemes under the continual leakage model. In the security notions, there are two kinds of attackers, namely, Type I adversary (outsider) and Type II adversary (honest-but-curious KGC). Both kinds of attackers are extended from the security notions of traditional certificateless signature (CLS) schemes by adding the Initial key extract leak query and the Sign leak query. Type I adversary may obtain not only the leakage information of a user's initial key of the private key in the Sign phase, but also the leakage information of the KGC's system secret key in the Initial key extract phase. Type II adversary knows the initial key of any entity while obtaining the leakage information of a user's secret key of the private key in the Sign phase. In the generic bilinear group model, we demonstrate that our LR-CLS scheme possesses existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks for both Type I and Type II adversaries under the continual leakage model.
